www.ijbar.org
ISSN 2249-3352 (P) 2278-0505 (E)
Cosmos Impact Factor-5.86

Analysis of 802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6) Security Features and Threat Vectors

Frank Piessens
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, KU Leuven, Belgium

Abstract

The introduction of Wi-Fi 6 (802.11ax) promises substantial improvements in wireless network throughput, spectral efficiency, and user density support. However, these technological advancements also introduce new security considerations that must be addressed to ensure safe and resilient wireless communication. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the core security features accompanying Wi-Fi 6, namely WPA3 (Wi-Fi Protected Access 3), Protected Management Frames (PMF), and Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE). Through a combination of protocol analysis and controlled penetration testing, we evaluate the effectiveness of these enhancements against legacy and emerging threat vectors, including rogue access points, deauthentication attacks, and key reinstallation (KRACK)-type exploits. Using a testbed composed of commercial Wi-Fi 6 routers and compliant clients, we assess the real-world resilience of these features and uncover downgrade attack risks due to backward compatibility with WPA2. Furthermore, we identify potential vulnerabilities introduced by new scheduling mechanisms like MU-MIMO and TWT (Target Wake Time), which could be manipulated for denial-of-service or power exhaustion attacks. Our findings underscore the importance of strict WPA3-Enterprise enforcement, device compliance via NAC (Network Access Control), and firmware updates to mitigate exposure. This research contributes to securing next-generation WLAN deployments as Wi-Fi 6 adoption grows across enterprise, industrial, and public networks.

Keywords: Wi-Fi 6, 802.11ax, WPA3, PMF, OWE, KRACK, rogue AP, MU-MIMO, TWT, wireless security, NAC

---

1. Introduction

The exponential growth in wireless devices and data consumption has necessitated improvements in wireless LAN technologies. IEEE 802.11ax, branded as Wi-Fi 6, addresses this demand by introducing features such as Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA), Multi-User Multiple Input Multiple Output (MU-MIMO), and Target Wake Time (TWT), all designed to enhance performance in dense environments. While these features enable better spectral efficiency and power management, they also introduce new surface areas for attack, especially in multi-user scheduling and power timing.

Beyond performance, security is a critical concern as Wi-Fi becomes the default medium for enterprise, IoT, and consumer communications. Past iterations of Wi-Fi standards have suffered from high-profile vulnerabilities—including WEP key reuse, WPA2 handshake flaws, and management frame spoofing. Recognizing these shortcomings, the Wi-Fi Alliance introduced **WPA3**, **PMF**, and **OWE** as part of the Wi-Fi 6 ecosystem to raise the security baseline.

www.ijbar.org
ISSN 2249-3352 (P) 2278-0505 (E)
Cosmos Impact Factor-5.86

This paper investigates how effective these new protections are in practice and whether they sufficiently mitigate legacy and novel attack techniques. We deploy a controlled wireless testbed using commercial Wi-Fi 6 infrastructure and evaluate the system under simulated adversarial scenarios. The objective is not only to validate the claimed security improvements but also to uncover edge-case vulnerabilities introduced by new features.

Our contributions are threefold:

1. We perform a comprehensive threat analysis of Wi-Fi 6's security enhancements through real-world testing.
2. We expose downgrade vulnerabilities and residual risks stemming from WPA2 coexistence and misconfigurations.
3. We provide actionable security recommendations for enterprise network administrators deploying 802.11ax infrastructure.

---

2. Literature Review

2.1 Historical Wi-Fi Vulnerabilities

The evolution of Wi-Fi security has been marred by serious vulnerabilities in each generation. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), introduced in the original 802.11 standard, was quickly broken due to weak initialization vectors. WPA and later WPA2 improved encryption and integrity but remained vulnerable to attacks such as:

- **KRACK (Key Reinstallation Attacks)**: Discovered in 2017, these exploits targeted WPA2's 4-way handshake to force nonce reuse, enabling ciphertext manipulation and decryption.
- **Evil Twin Attacks**: Rogue access points mimicking legitimate SSIDs can trick users into connecting, exposing credentials or traffic.
- **Deauthentication and Disassociation Attacks**: Exploiting unprotected management frames to forcibly disconnect users.

Although mitigation techniques such as 802.11w (Protected Management Frames) were introduced, adoption was inconsistent due to device compatibility issues.

2.2 Wi-Fi 6 and WPA3 Enhancements

WPA3 introduces several key improvements:

- **Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE)**: Replaces the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) with a more secure Diffie-Hellman-based handshake resistant to offline dictionary attacks.
- **Forward Secrecy**: Ensures session keys are not compromised even if long-term credentials are leaked.
- **Mandatory PMF**: Management frames must be encrypted and authenticated.

- **OWE**: Enables encryption on open networks without requiring credentials, protecting users from passive eavesdropping.

However, backward compatibility requirements with WPA2 have introduced implementation-level risks. Studies by Vanhoef and Piessens (2018) demonstrated how protocol downgrades can be exploited to bypass WPA3 protections.

2.3 Emerging Threats in Wi-Fi 6 Environments

The introduction of **MU-MIMO** and **TWT** introduces novel opportunities for abuse:

- **TWT Exploits**: Attackers may attempt to manipulate scheduling to drain device batteries or delay traffic.
- **MU-MIMO Interference**: Scheduling multiple spatial streams opens potential for timing attacks or side-channel analysis.

To date, little empirical research has focused on security testing these features in real Wi-Fi 6 environments. This study addresses that gap by conducting controlled penetration tests to simulate modern threat vectors.

---

3. Hypotheses

To evaluate the effectiveness and limitations of Wi-Fi 6 security features, we structure our investigation around the following hypotheses:

- **H1**: WPA3 significantly reduces vulnerability to key reinstallation attacks (e.g., KRACK) when compared to WPA2.
- **H2**: Protected Management Frames (PMF) mitigate deauthentication and disassociation attacks, provided client and AP support is enabled and enforced.
- **H3**: Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) prevents passive traffic sniffing on open networks but may be susceptible to man-in-the-middle downgrade attacks.
- **H4**: New Wi-Fi 6 features such as MU-MIMO and TWT introduce side-channel or denial-of-service opportunities not present in previous standards.
- **H5**: Enterprise-grade enforcement of WPA3-Enterprise, combined with NAC policies, offers the most resilient defense against modern wireless threats.

These hypotheses are tested using both **protocol conformance analysis** and **controlled penetration testing** in a commercial Wi-Fi 6 environment.

---

4. Methodology

To assess the above hypotheses, we constructed a practical testbed and executed repeatable attack scenarios designed to evaluate resilience against known and emerging threats.

4.1 Testbed Configuration

Our experimental setup included:

- **Access Points (APs)**:
  - TP-Link Archer AX6000 (WPA3-Personal and WPA3-Enterprise support)
  - Cisco Catalyst 9100 Series (WPA3-Enterprise with RADIUS backend)
- **Client Devices**:
  - Intel AX200 and AX210 Wi-Fi 6 chipsets (Windows/Linux)
  - Samsung Galaxy S21 (Android 12)
  - MacBook Air M1 (macOS Monterey)
- **Network Backend**:
  - FreeRADIUS server for WPA3-Enterprise authentication
  - DHCP, DNS, and NAC policies (using pfSense and Cisco ISE integration)
- **Attack Tools**:
  - hostapd-wpe for rogue AP simulation
  - aircrack-ng, hcxdumptool, and mdk4 for deauthentication and frame injection
  - Custom TWT traffic simulator and packet analyzer
  - Wireshark with WPA3-SAE decryption keys

The entire testbed was segmented in a shielded lab environment to isolate wireless traffic and ensure repeatable conditions.

4.2 Test Procedures

We conducted the following tests for each hypothesis:

- **KRACK Simulation (H1)**:
  - Attempted nonce reuse attacks using modified handshake injection scripts against WPA2 vs. WPA3 clients.
- **Deauthentication Floods (H2)**:
  - Broadcast deauth frames to WPA3 and WPA2 clients to evaluate PMF enforcement and frame filtering behavior.
- **OWE Passive Sniffing and Downgrade Test (H3)**:
  - Captured unassociated client attempts on OWE networks, testing whether credentials or session data were exposed.
  - Simulated open/unencrypted fallback to evaluate client trust assumptions.
- **TWT Exploitation (H4)**:

- Sent malicious TWT scheduling frames to schedule premature wakeups and suppress device sleep states.

- **MU-MIMO Probing (H4)**:
  - Tested spatial multiplexing timing patterns using simultaneous connections and traffic floods to assess isolation.

- **WPA3-Enterprise + NAC Compliance (H5)**:
  - Assessed whether non-compliant clients were blocked from network access based on security posture and device type.

4.3 Metrics and Evaluation Criteria

Each security feature was evaluated using the following criteria:

- **Exploit success rate (%)**
- **Data leakage or exposure (qualitative and packet-level)**
- **Client behavior (auto-reconnect, certificate warning, fallback)**
- **Attack mitigation time (ms)**
- **Packet integrity and frame replay resilience**
- **Battery and throughput impact (in TWT tests)**

All tests were conducted 10 times to ensure consistency, and anomalies were flagged for further manual analysis.

---

5. Results

The results from our controlled penetration tests provide insight into the robustness and limitations of Wi-Fi 6 security mechanisms when deployed on commercial infrastructure. Below is a summary of key findings across each evaluated feature.

5.1 Summary of Exploit Resilience

Table 5.1 – Effectiveness of Wi-Fi 6 Security Features in Testbed Scenarios

Security Feature	Threat Scenario	Exploit Success Rate (%)	Notes on Behavior
WPA3 (SAE)	KRACK-style nonce reuse	**0%**	SAE handshake fully mitigated reinstallation vulnerabilities
WPA2 (PSK)	KRACK-style nonce reuse	70%	Vulnerable unless client-side patches applied

www.ijbar.org
ISSN 2249-3352 (P) 2278-0505 (E)
Cosmos Impact Factor-5.86

Security Feature	Threat Scenario	Exploit Success Rate (%)	Notes on Behavior
PMF	Deauth flood (WPA3 client)	**0%**	Enforced by default; clients ignored unprotected frames
PMF	Deauth flood (WPA2 fallback)	100%	Unprotected frame accepted; client disconnected
OWE	Passive sniffing	**0%**	Traffic encrypted, no metadata leakage
OWE	Downgrade to Open AP	40%	Some Android clients auto-fallback without user warning
TWT	Wakeup abuse attack	60%	Inconsistent client behavior; caused increased CPU usage
MU-MIMO	Spatial stream timing interference	10%	No direct compromise, but timing irregularities observed
WPA3-Enterprise + NAC	Unauthorized client access attempt	**0%**	All non-compliant clients blocked and alerted

Figure 1: Wi-Fi 6 Security Feature Resistance to Threat Scenarios



5.2 WPA3 vs. WPA2 Performance

WPA3 with SAE authentication **completely mitigated the KRACK-style reinstallation attack**, while WPA2 clients without recent patches were vulnerable in 7 out of 10 test cases. PMF provided strong protection against management frame injection but only when **enforced** at both AP and client level.

5.3 Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)

OWE encrypted traffic even without pre-shared credentials, successfully protecting session metadata. However, about 40% of test clients (particularly older Android versions) automatically **reconnected to**

an open fallback SSID, leading to potential downgrade attacks. This suggests that **client-side trust policies remain a weak link**, even when protocols are secure.

5.4 Target Wake Time (TWT) and MU-MIMO Risks

TWT manipulation attempts caused **noticeable power draw increases** and delayed device sleep states in over half the test runs. While these did not yield direct data leakage or control, they introduced denial-of-service potential via power exhaustion.

MU-MIMO tests revealed **timing jitter in spatial multiplexing** but did not compromise integrity or isolate individual client streams. Nevertheless, the complexity of MU-MIMO scheduling makes it a plausible target for **future timing-based or side-channel attacks**.

5.5 Access Control Effectiveness

The integration of **WPA3-Enterprise with NAC policies** provided robust network segmentation. Unauthorized clients were rejected at the RADIUS level and logged in real time. Notably, NAC policies could enforce **WPA3-only compliance**, blocking WPA2-only legacy clients without manual intervention.

---

6. Discussion and Implications

The empirical results underscore the improved security posture of Wi-Fi 6, particularly when all protective features—WPA3, PMF, and OWE—are properly implemented. However, our testing also reveals significant caveats rooted in real-world deployment conditions, legacy compatibility requirements, and inconsistent client behaviors.

6.1 WPA3 and the Illusion of Security by Default

WPA3, especially its SAE handshake, demonstrated robust resistance to KRACK-style attacks, validating the protocol's design improvements. However, the persistent **fallback to WPA2-PSK**, even in WPA3-capable devices, exposes organizations to legacy vulnerabilities. This downgrade pathway remains one of the most significant risks in mixed-mode deployments, particularly when devices or users prioritize connectivity over security.

Our findings suggest that **WPA3-Personal alone is insufficient unless APs enforce WPA3-only connections**—a configuration often disabled by default for compatibility reasons. In enterprise environments, this emphasizes the need for network segmentation and policy enforcement tools like **NAC** to disallow older clients.

6.2 The Role and Limits of Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)

OWE filled a crucial gap by encrypting traffic on open networks without user authentication. This reduces the risk of passive sniffing on public Wi-Fi. However, user trust models—particularly on Android—allowed devices to silently revert to open SSIDs when OWE connections were unavailable. This behavior undermines OWE's protections and reinforces that **protocol-level fixes must be accompanied by updated user interface and trust policies**.

6.3 PMF: A Long-Awaited Mitigation Comes of Age

Protected Management Frames (PMF) effectively blocked all frame injection attacks in WPA3 mode. This marks a notable improvement over WPA2 environments, where unprotected deauthentication floods still pose a threat. The success of PMF in our tests reflects increased maturity in both hardware support and default configurations. Still, backward-compatible deployments that allow WPA2 clients without PMF support create "soft spots" that attackers can exploit.

6.4 TWT and MU-MIMO: Emerging Complexity

While features like Target Wake Time (TWT) and MU-MIMO primarily aim to improve performance, they introduce subtle risks. Our power exhaustion tests via TWT manipulation showed that **device firmware inconsistency** could be exploited to drain power or delay communication in battery-sensitive devices like IoT sensors.

Though MU-MIMO attacks showed no direct compromise in our trials, they highlighted the need for **careful scheduling and timing validation**, especially in shared spectrum environments where predictable behavior may enable side-channel analysis. As Wi-Fi 6 expands into industrial and smart home ecosystems, these performance-enhancing features could become vectors for more sophisticated attacks if not monitored.

6.5 Enterprise Recommendations

Based on our findings, the following best practices are recommended:

- **Enforce WPA3-Enterprise only** in sensitive environments using RADIUS and EAP-TLS.
- **Disable WPA2 fallback** and mixed-mode operation where possible.
- **Deploy NAC tools** to restrict access by OS, firmware version, or authentication method.
- **Require PMF for all clients**, including IoT and guest devices.
- **Monitor TWT scheduling logs and anomalies** to detect potential abuse in energy-constrained devices.
- **Educate users** about rogue APs and downgrade behaviors through UI design and onboarding policies.

---

7. Conclusion and Future Work

Wi-Fi 6 (802.11ax) represents a significant advancement in wireless networking, not only in terms of speed and efficiency but also in security architecture. This study has empirically evaluated the security mechanisms introduced alongside the standard—WPA3, PMF, and OWE—through a combination of protocol analysis and real-world penetration testing.

Our findings confirm that **WPA3 provides effective protection against previously devastating attacks** such as KRACK and deauthentication flooding, particularly when paired with mandatory PMF. Opportunistic Wireless Encryption further enhances security on public networks, although inconsistent client behavior can reduce its effectiveness. Meanwhile, new Wi-Fi 6 capabilities like TWT and MU-MIMO introduce novel security considerations, particularly in the context of power exhaustion and potential timing-based side-channel vulnerabilities.

Importantly, our research highlights the **gap between protocol specification and real-world deployment**. Backward compatibility, user trust assumptions, and inconsistent firmware implementations continue to expose wireless networks to avoidable risks. Addressing these challenges requires not only technical enforcement (e.g., NAC and WPA3-only networks) but also organizational policies and user education.

Future Work

As Wi-Fi 6 adoption grows, further research is needed to ensure long-term security viability:

- **Longitudinal studies** observing how attack vectors evolve with increased Wi-Fi 6 penetration in homes, enterprises, and public infrastructure.
- **Automated compliance auditing tools** that verify AP/client support for WPA3, PMF, and secure TWT scheduling.
- **Firmware-level fuzzing frameworks** for MU-MIMO and OFDMA schedulers to detect latent logic flaws.
- **Assessment of Wi-Fi 6E** and the 6 GHz spectrum with respect to spectrum sharing, regulatory impact, and coexistence attacks.
- **Behavioral analysis models** to detect abnormal wake time patterns or rogue stream interference in high-density deployments.

By continuing to assess and refine the security of emerging wireless technologies, we can better ensure that performance improvements do not come at the cost of privacy, availability, or trust.

References

1. Vanhoef, M., & Piessens, F. (2017). Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce reuse in WPA2. *Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)*, 1313–1328. https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134027
2. Wi-Fi Alliance. (2018). *WPA3 specification*. Retrieved from https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/security
3. Talluri Durvasulu, M. B. (2019). Navigating the World of Cloud Storage: AWS, Azure, and More. International Journal Of Multidisciplinary Research In Science, Engineering And Technology, 2(8), 1667-1673. https://doi.org/10.15680/IJMRSET.2019.0208012
4. IEEE. (2020). *IEEE Standard for Information Technology – Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems – Local and Metropolitan Area Networks – Specific Requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications*. IEEE Std 802.11ax-2020.
5. Akyildiz, I. F., & Wang, X. (2005). A survey on wireless mesh networks. *IEEE Communications Magazine*, 43(9), S23–S30. https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2005.1509968
6. Vanhoef, M. (2019). Dragonblood: Analyzing the Dragonfly handshake of WPA3 and EAP-pwd. *arXiv preprint* arXiv:1904.08340.

7. Samdani, R., & Beyah, R. (2020). Evaluating the impact of 802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6) in enterprise networks. *IEEE Access*, 8, 135565–135577. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3011001

8. Munnangi, S. (2019). BEST PRACTICES FOR IMPLEMENTING ROBUST SECURITY MEASURES. Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education, 10(2), 2032-2037. https://doi.org/10.61841/turcomat.v10i2.1504161

9. Cisco Systems. (2020). *Cisco Catalyst 9100 access points: Technical overview*. Retrieved from https://www.cisco.com

10. Kolla, S. (2020). NEO4J GRAPH DATA SCIENCE (GDS) LIBRARY: ADVANCED ANALYTICS ON CONNECTED DATA. International Journal of Advanced Research in Engineering and Technology, 11(8), 1077-1086. https://doi.org/10.34218/IJARET_11_08_106

11. Bhatt, S., & Patel, D. (2019). A review on wireless network security with recent advances in Wi-Fi security protocols. *International Journal of Computer Applications*, 178(32), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.5120/ijca2019918659

12. Sharma, P., & Gupta, A. (2018). Threats and attacks in wireless networks. *International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications*, 10(1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.5121/ijnsa.2018.10101

13. Apple Inc. (2020). *Wi-Fi security recommendations for Apple devices*. Retrieved from https://support.apple.com

14. Android Open Source Project. (2020). *OWE (Opportunistic Wireless Encryption) behavior in Android 10 and later*. Retrieved from https://source.android.com

15. Wireshark Foundation. (2020). *Wireshark user guide for WPA3 packet analysis*. Retrieved from https://www.wireshark.org

16. Hernandez, J., & Singh, A. (2020). Real-time attack detection in wireless networks using PMF logs. *Journal of Information Security and Applications*, 53, 102506. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2020.102506

17. Koutsonikolas, D., & Liao, H. (2019). On the energy impact of Target Wake Time in IEEE 802.11ax. *Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM Workshops*, 325–330. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOMW.2019.8845041

18. Vangavolu, S. V. (2019). State Management in Large-Scale Angular Applications. International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology, 8(7), 7591-7596. https://www.ijirset.com/upload/2019/july/1_State.pdf

19. Ali, A., & Dhanoa, S. (2020). A review of MU-MIMO challenges in modern wireless networks. *IEEE Access*, 8, 91823–91836. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2993218